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I	want	to	look	at	management	more	generally	as	a	(behavioural)	technology	that	uses	technology	to	relate	to	the	other	assuming	this	is	a	way	to	make	the	other’s	behaviour	follow	a	specific	path.	As	such	it	is	resonant	with	information	processing	technology	that	algorithmically	relates	information	to	certain,	predetermined	outcomes	(coded)	when	processed.	Technology	would	then	correspond	to	a	legitimate	expectation	–	amongst	decision	makers	in	particular	–	that	a	certain	input	should	yield	a	certain	output	if	processed	using	a	certain	technique:	the	‘mode	of	causality’	that	Heidegger	points	to	in	the	opening	quote.	It	is	specific	for	digital	technology	that	it	promises	no	distortion	(noise	immune)	in	transmission,	that	it	consumes	fewer	resources	when	storing	and	transmitting,	but	that	it	requires	more	bandwidth	to	transmit	the	same	information	compared	to	analogue	technology.	In	perspective	of	the	washing	out	of	noise	that	digitalization	represents,	I	suggest	that	we	inquire	into	whether	the	sources	of	the	new	spring	perhaps	primarily	from	the	noisy	part	of	the	organisation	(information-wise).	Would	the	clean	information	handling	of	digital	media	processing	lead	to	that	the	baby	is	thrown	out	with	the	bathwater	in	the	washing	away	of	the	analogue	dirt?	Roughly	speaking;	you	are	not	likely	to	invent	new	dialogues	with	the	ATM,	it	has	only	a	limited,	preprogramed/coded	set	of	algorithmically	enabled	responses.	But	maybe	the	Herakleitan	playing	child	that,	in	his	description,	rules	the	world,	can	still	bring	about	creative	becoming	vid	affectively	engaged	bodies	in	motion?	Maybe	the	multiplicity	and	open-endedness	of	play,	most	of	which	reads	like	mess	from	a	digital	perspective	on	what	makes	algorithms	tick,	finds	ways	through	the	tightly	coded	organisational	landscape?	But	what	is	there	before	F.	W.	Taylor	and	Herbert	Simon,	that	places	management	on	the	path	that	today	makes	softwareized	decision	making	into	normal	and	businesses	like	SAP	grow?	A	recent	article	from	The	Economist	(Sept.	12th,	2015),	referring	to	a	piece	on	Amazon	in	New	York	Times,	states:	“…digital	Taylorism	looks	set	to	be	a	more	powerful	force	than	its	analogue	predecessor.	The	prominent	technology	firms	that	set	the	tone	for	much	of	the	business	world	are	embracing	it.	[…]	Pentland’s	sociometric	badges	have	produced	some	counter-intuitive	results:	for	example,	in	a	study	of	80	employees	in	a	Bank	of	
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forces	of	the	pincers.	The	heart	is	clearly	in	the	grip	of	the	pincers,	and	there	is	no	doubt	that	this	grip	is	potentially	devastating.	The	pincers	provide	a	lever	effect	that	multiplies	the	force	of	the	hand:	reason	is	strengthened	by	technology.	The	message:	technology	increases	your	force,	enables	you	to	dominate	other	forces,	brings	you	to	the	favourable	position	in	a	hierarchy	of	forces.	Leo	(2009)	suggests	both	messages	are	held	together	in	the	image	–	a	poetry	of	composition:	we	can	control	our	affectus/passion,	but	it	also	goes	beyond	what	we	can	decide/control/master:		“In	Spinoza’s	Ethica,	moreover,	affectus	are	not	reducible	to	feelings	or	emotions.	Affects,	rather,	exceed,	reconfigure	and	reorganize	bodies	and	subjects;	they	are	thus	constitutive	of,	and	integral	to,	a	dynamic	economy	of	activity	and	passivity.	In	the	Emblemata	Politica	a	similar	definition	of	affectus	is	revealed	in	the	tension	between	the	Latin	poetry	and	the	image—between	the	determination	of	affectus	as	a	passion	within	the	subject’s	control	and	its	status	in	a	larger	divine	economy,	the	province	of	God,	exceeding	the	limits	of	human	agency.”	(Leo,	2009:	393).			This	is	fully	consistent	with	Spinoza’s	view	of	affect,	passion	and	action,	and	how	it	is	interpreted	by	Gilles	Deleuze,	who	renews	the	way	we	understand	Spinoza	(Deleuze,	1988;	Spindler,	2010).	An	affect,	in	Spinoza’s	Ethics,	is	described	as	a	duration	that	makes	a	body/mind	tend	towards	the	next	state	in	a	way	that	either	increases	its	power	of	acting	or	decreases	its	power	of	acting	(Deleuze,	1988:	48-49).	Affect	describes	a	body/mind’s	potential	for	interaction.	And	therefore,	as	noted	above,	the	analogue	(body	and	thought,	they	are	parallel	to	Spinoza)	is	a	‘fold	ahead’,	since	it	tends/leaps,	moved	by	affect,	beyond	the	present	limit:	it	brings	interactive	capacity	also	to	the	imagined-to-come.		Principally,	for	Spinoza,	only	God	can	act	in	the	full	sense	of	being	capable	of	adequate	ideas	that	can	guide	the	body/mind	to	act.	The	rest	of	us	are	passionate	beings	that	become-new	all	the	time	by	forming	inadequate	ideas,	that	makes	us	open	to	external	ideas	that	can	act	upon	us	to	some	extent	and	make	us	move	to	a	greater	or	lesser	force	of	existing/power	to	act,	than	before	–	
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local	conditions	–	as	is	the	case	with	bureaucratic	procedures	–	but	rather	coded	for	context-independent,	universal	use.	“…[C]ompared	to	the	strictly	standardized	and	codified	character	of	computer-based	applications,	bureaucratic	rules	were	vague	and	open	enough	to	be	shaped	by	the	specific	circumstances	of	particular	organizations.”	(Kallinikos,	2001:	58).	Such	openness	allowed	for	tactical	interventions,	insinuations	that	explored	and	experimented	in	the	cracks	of	the	strategic	grid	of	the	bureaucratic	system,	so	as	to	transform	and	change	the	whole.	An	analogue	technology	would	thus	also	allow	for	creativity,	which	seems	to	be	‘coded’	out	of	the	information	processing	systems	in	the	digital	era	of	un-human	precision.	The	less	precise	does	call	upon	judgement,	whereas	the	(digitally)	precise	only	needs	a	decision	to	execute	prolonging	of	what	the	data	tells	you	(i.e.,	the	incipient	causality).	There	is,	according	to	the	digital	information	logic,	only	right	or	wrong,	correct	or	incorrect,	efficient	or	inefficient	ways	of	doing.	One	and	zero,	no	in-betweens.	Isn’t	creativity	analogue	in	this	sense?	Or,	rather,	isn’t	creativity’s	opportunities	infinite	in	the	analogue	representation	of	the	world?	The	analogue	is	processually	continuous	with	an	infinite	number	of	potential	in-betweens	and	a	movement	that	at	all	times	is	saturated	by	potentiality,	or	tendency	to	become.	The	digital	is	like	a	Lego	approximation	of	life,	in	bits	and	straight	lines	without	tendencies:	every	piece	goes	on	according	to	a	certain,	preprogramed	quantity,	and	when	it	stops	it	stops	in	full	(and	the	next	starts):	
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	There	are	many	excellent	inquiries	into	management	as	a	technology	(for	a	recent	example,	see	Bloom,	Sadun,	and	Van	Reenen,	2015),	where	management	is	defined	(for	survey-based	measurement	purposes)	as	monitoring,	target-setting,	and	incentives/people	management.	Such	definitions	can	themselves	be	thought	of	as	a	digitalisation	of	the	managerial	practice	and	function.	The	translation	of	management	practice	into	a	conceptual	definition	is	meant	to	serve	an	operational	definition	that	lends	itself	to	quantification	and	statistical	processing.	It	becomes	–	in	an	analogy	to	the	image	above	–	a	digital	representation	of	the	analogue	practice.	In	contrast,	qualitative	methods	can	be	said	to	represent	a	strive	to	stay	with	language	(metaphors,	images)	so	as	to	keep	life	in	language.	Anthropologists	have	called	this	an	emic	view	(coined	by	the	linguist	Pike	in	1954;	locals’,	native’s	view)	and	the	ideal	scholarly	translation	of	such	into	text	as	‘thick	description’	(Geertz,	1974).	It	is	important	to	note,	as	Greenblatt	(1997)	does	(reading	Geertz)	that	thickness	is	a	result	of	description	and,	thus,	that	language	matters	(digital	or	analogue,	statistical	or	literary)	in	grasping	life.	We	can	serve	executing	decision-makers	with	data,	but	we	can	also	serve	imagination	by	including	tendencies,	affect	and	stuff	that	help	us	leap	ahead.	In	process	studies	that	also	strive	to	understand	how	the	organisational	conditions	for	creativity	is	changing	in	a	digitalized	world,	it	seems	wise	to	strive	
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for	an	analogue	resonance	with	lived	practice	that	we	study.	The	experience-near	point	of	view	that	is	dear	to	Geertzian	anthropological	ethnographers	comes,	however,	with	the	challenge	of	bringing	this	point	of	view	into	language.	Greenblatt	has	tackled	this	challenge,	leaning	on	Geertz.	When	Geertz	describes	the	interpretive	strategies	that	anthropologists	use	as	they	try	to	understand	the	symbolic	systems	and	life	patterns	they	study,	Greenblatt	says	this	resonates	with	a	literary	theorist	like	him.	This	is	because	language	–	also	literature	–	here	makes	contact	with	reality,	with	pieces	of	writing	or,	as	Greenblatt	clarifies,	with	‘verbal	traces	less	self-consciously	detached	from	the	lives	real	men	and	women	actually	live.’	(Greenblatt,	1997:	14).	Thickness,	again,	a	concept	Geertz	developed	from	Gilbert	Ryle’s	1968	lecture	on	thinking,	is	for	Ryle	“…not	in	the	object;	it	is	in	the	narrative	surroundings,	the	add-ons,	the	nested	frames.”	(Greenblatt,	1997:	17).		A	key	to	the	force	with	which	Geertz’	text	has	impacted	on	the	field	of	ethnography,	and	why	it	is	interesting	for	this	article,	lies	in	how	it	has	made	“…the	literary	and	the	nonliterary	seem	to	be	each	other's	thick	description.	That	both	the	literary	work	and	the	anthropological	(or	historical)	anecdote	are	texts,	that	both	are	fictions	in	the	sense	of	things	made,	that	both	are	shaped	by	the	imagination	and	by	the	available	resources	of	narration…”	(Greenblatt,	1997:	22)	is	the	reason	to	why	they	are	not	separated	by	some	non-traversable	canyon	dividing	the	real	from	the	fictitious.	At	the	bottom	of	the	canyon	runs	language	like	a	life-giving	flow	that	we	cannot	step	into	twice	but	which	has	made	the	rift	which	we	cross.	And	we	cross	using	the	only	method	that	performatively	affirms	the	life-bringing	capacity	of	language:	by	taking	the	plunge,	by	speaking	and	writing	with	the	force	of	poiesis.	This	seems	to	me	as	the	important	difference	–	is	taking	the	plunge	part	of	how	you	see	yourself	as	researcher,	or	not?	Performative	approaches	have	urged	us	to	‘jump	in’	(Beyes	and	Steyaert,	2011;	to	experiment,	Steyaert,	2012).	The	balance	thereby	has	to	shift	to	“…techniques	which	embrace	their	own	inventiveness	and	are	not	afraid	to	own	up	to	the	fact	that	they	add	(if	so	meagerly)	to	reality.”	(Massumi,	2002:	13).	We	arrive	at	imagination	and	the	poetic	as	ways	of	making	the	world	and	add	what	is	missing.	This	builds	on	the	analogue	as	a	productive	vagueness,	a	‘fold	ahead’	of	the	digital	noiseless	representation	of	the	world	that	fits	operations	management	
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motivation	underlying	exchange,	and	only	that,	and	“in	the	rest	of	Smith’s	writings,	there	are	extensive	discussion	of	the	role	of	other	motivations	that	influence	human	action	and	behaviour.”	writes	Amartya	Sen	(2010).		In	this	world,	becoming	increasingly	incapable	of	understanding	the	nature	and	motivation	of	human	action	outside	the	models	served	by	fashionable	economics,	the	dawn	of	the	Business	School	and	its	central	discipline	–	management	–	quickly	became	a	natural	extension	of	this	‘level	of	reality’.	Management	promised	to	marry	behaviourism	(psychology	had	advanced	along	instrumental	lines	too	in-between	the	two	world	wars)	and	economism	in	ways	that	promised	control	of	the	organisations.	Especially	in	its	North	American	version,	management	became	the	new	explanation	to	why	competitiveness	was	achieved.	Alfred	Chandler	(1977)	made	a	thin	but	well-spun	thread	back	to	Adam	Smith	when	he	adopted	the	‘invisible	hand’	metaphor	of	Smith’s	to	describe	management	as	the	‘visible	hand.’		The	role	of	the	manager	–	from	Italian	maneggiare,	meaning	‘to	handle-’	or	especially	‘to	control	a	horse’	–	is	here	implied	as	the	‘visible	hand’	that	functions	as	a	lever	and	adjustment	on	the	market	forces	(Chandler,	1977).	Economy	no	longer	refers	to	the	Greek	oikos	(oikonomia,	translated	as	dispositio	in	Latin,	i.e.,	dispositif	in	French,	translated	as	apparatus	in	English),	the	proper	management	of	the	household,	rather	it	emerges	as	a	new	ontology	where	the	population	as	a	whole	is	to	be	controlled	(Tellmann,	2009)	by	the	help	of	statistics.	It	seems	to	me	that	the	1617	image	above	is	part	of	this	campaign,	the	launching	of	a	new	governmental	regime,	where	economic	behaviour	generally	is	to	be	considered	constitutive	of	modern	humans	–	homo	oeconomicus	takes	centre	stage.	People	are	now	called	upon	in	this	specific	sense	that	they	are	supposed	to	become	governable	precisely	by	understanding	reality	as	economy	and	act	rationally	accordingly.	Otherwise,	‘fortune	will	swim	away	from	you’	(Poem	above).	What	role	has	technology	in	this?	Technology	rests	on	the	law	of	efficiency,	Ellul	(1954)	suggested.	Government	of	the	whole	population	co-emerges,	thus,	with	the	development	of	statistical	calculation	as	an	efficient	
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technique	and	technology.	But	there	is	a	clash	or	tension	between	the	free	movement,	the	playful	act	and	the	rational	act	in	the	specifically	economic	sense	–	a	clash	between	homo	ludens	and	homo	oeconomicus	if	you	like.	It	glimpses	through	in	Spinoza.	Trained	as	a	lens-maker,	as	a	polisher	of	lenses,	he	writes,	in	a	private	letter	to	the	Royal	Society	(London)	secretary	Henry	Oldenburg,	and	comments	on	a	another	lens-maker’s	(Christiaan	Huygen’s)	technological	development	with	the	following	note:	“The	said	Huygens	has	been	a	totally	occupied	man,	and	so	he	is,	with	polishing	glass	dioptrics;	to	that	end	a	workshop	he	has	outfitted,	and	in	it	he	is	able	to	“turn”	pans	–	as	is	said,	it’s	certainly	polished	–	what	tho’	thusly	he	will	have	accomplished	I	don’t	know,	nor,	to	admit	a	truth,	strongly	do	I	desire	to	know.	For	me,	as	is	said,	experience	has	taught	that	with	spherical	pans,	being	polished	by	a	free	hand	is	safer	and	better	than	any	machine.”		There	is	a	tension	between	wisdom,	built	from	the	free,	analogue	hand,	guided	by	experience,	and	the	insensate	hand,	following	the	digital	template	prescribed	by	technology.	Is	the	manus,	the	hand	of	management,	this	Ratio	that	is	guided	by	the	template	coded	into	technology,	serving	predictability	and	efficiency	today	–	more	than	ever	–	what	prevents	the	freedom	needed	for	creativity	to	happen	in	organisations?	Jacques	Ellul,	again,	writes:	“However	important	and	impressive	mechanical	technique	remains,	it	is	only	accessory	to	other	factors	which	are	much	more	decisive,	if	less	spectacular.	I	have	in	mind	the	vast	amount	of	organization	in	every	field,	the	recognition	of	which	led	James	Burnham	to	write	The	Managerial	Revolution.”	(p.	11).	In	‘The	Managerial	Revolution’,	originally	published	in	19411	Burnham	notes	that	the	managerialisation	of	society	is	characterized	by	locus	of	sovereignty	shifting	from	the	parliament	to	the	managerial	class.		What	he	says,	in	effect,	is	that	management	quickly	became	the	dominant	force,	normality,	theory,	and	ideology	for	organizing	modern	organisations	(business	or	non-business).	“What	is	occurring	in	this	transition	is	a	drive	for	social	domination,	for	power	and	privilege,	for	the	position	of	ruling	class,	by	the	social	group	or	class	of	the	managers…”	(Burnham:	1941:	71).	Studies	regarding	the	US	show	that	both	income	gap	(between	managers	and																																																									1	Note	this	is	36	years	before	Chandler	writes	‘The	visible	hand	–	the	managerial	revolution	in	American	business,’	and	8	years	before	George	Orwell’s	‘1984.’	
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If	management	can	be	understood	as	a	technology	in	itself	there	would	of	course	be	a	sense	in	which	F.W.	Taylor’s	basis	in	engineering	still	defines	what	management	is.	The	instrumentality	of	technology	is	here	understood	as	that	“…it	serves	the	end	of	another,	only	to	the	degree	that	it	realizes	its	own	end.”	(Agamben,	2015:	70).	I	have	sought	to	approach	the	role	of	today’s	information	processing	support	systems	–	such	as	Enterprise	Resource	Planning	(ERP)	software	in	particular	–	genealogically,	to	inquire	into	whether,	as	technology,	management	reduces	organising	to	technē	and	squeezes	poiesis	out	in	its	instrumental	focus	on	its	own	end.	In	the	‘hands	of	management’	(management	itself	being	an	instrumental	hand	–	manus,	Latin	for	hand)	such	software	also	grasps	the	hand	that	holds	it	in	the	sense	that	it	serves	management	to	the	degree	that	it	realises	its	own	end:	algorithmically	controlled	organisation	(cf.	Beverungen,	2015).	Management	is	now	totally	dependent	on	information-processing	software.	When	the	‘raw	material’	used	by	various	management	control	software	is	information	about	human	behaviour,	the	user	of	such	software	becomes	raw	material	for	it	in	the	use.	Yet,	it	is	in	using	it	that	this	disposition	of	the	software	–	to	control	by	processing	information	–	is	realised:	“Thus	an	instrument	has	two	operations,	one	which	belongs	to	it	according	to	its	own	form,	and	another	which	belongs	to	it	insofar	as	it	is	moved	by	the	principal	agent	and	which	rises	above	the	ability	of	its	own	form.”	(Acquinas	3,	q.	27,	art.	4,	in	Agamben,	2015:	73).	‘According	to	its	own	form’	would	refer	to	the	algorithmic	mathematics	on	the	basis	of	which	the	software	operates	in	a	certain	way,	and	the	‘rise	above’	would	then	correspond	to	the	managerial	control	that	is	achieved	by	making	use	of	the	software	in	a	certain	way.	However,	when	you	push	the	control	buttons,	you	are	already	in	the	system	and	obey	predetermined	or	pre-programmed	responses.	This	is	an	important	part	of	the	softwarisation	of	the	organisation	(Beverungen,	2015).	Human	Resource	Development	software	has	since	long	re-defined	the	person	as	a	piece	of	‘human	capital.’	Enterprise	Resource	Planning	software	packages	(e.g.	such	that	SAP	sell)	need	the	HR-component	to	be	fitting	the	rest	of	the	software	system	in	order	to	fulfil	its	promises	(greater	control,	making	more	
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of	economy	as	a	reality	that	limits	practice.	It	moves	freely	in	the	space	for	play	that	imagination	has	led	the	body	to	assume	is	available,	bringing	action	to	the	virtual	fringe	of	things	(Massumi,	2002;	Hjorth,	2014).	Here	the	analogue	cannot	but	tend	towards	its	immanent	processual	nextness,	imagining	and	anticipating	the	becoming-more	of	the	world.	It	leaps	from	potential	to	actual,	gives	in	to	incipient	nextness	rolling	into	the	world’s	becoming-already-more.		Play,	however,	must	also	be	understood	as	how	we	learn	to	relate	to	this	new	‘level	of	intervention’	called	economy	(in	its	modern	sense).	We	play	our	way	to	learn	about	the	economy	of	social	life.	Play	maintains	this	capacity	in	some	form.	In	Agamben’s	conceptualization	of	governmentality,	which	critiques	Foucault’s	(Leshem,	2015),	there	would	be	bareness	in	play.	Playing	would	be	a	mode	characterized	by	potentiality	and	possibilities	of	becoming.	In	our	adult	lives	–	when	we	unlearn	our	capacity	to	be	children	–	playing	postpones	the	‘mature’	ways	of	behaving.	Play	creates	illusion	(inlusio,	inludere,	in-play)	and	the	“…fun	of	playing	resists	all	analysis,	all	logical	interpretation.”	(Huizinga,	1955:	3).	Playing	can	be	related	to	Agamben’s	concept	of	the	inoperable	life,	life	that	is	saturated	by	potential,	but	which	defies	the	templates	for	action	available.	This	is	when	life	can	‘donate’	itself	over	to	knowledge	(Robert,	2013;	Hjorth	and	Painter-Morland,	2016)	again,	as	a	bare	start.		The	new	seriousness	of	industrial	production,	the	technologically	super-charged	rationality	of	management,	had	no	room	for	ludere,	play,	and	homo	oeconomicus	instead	rose	to	reign	in	the	modern	organization.	But	maybe	it	is	precisely	for	the	reason	that	it	was	‘lost’,	that	it	now	is	something	we	desperately	need	to	find.	The	call	upon	the	creative,	entrepreneurial	employee,	the	one	that	needs	to	co-create	the	innovative	organization,	is	perhaps	also	a	cry	reflecting	a	sense	of	that	something	is	about	to	get	washed	out	for	good?	Underneath	all	talk	about	creativity,	all	ideas	about	innovation	management	(Van	de	Ven,	1999)	and	managing	creative	(Amabile,	1998)	or	managing	for	creativity	(Florida	and	Goodnight,	2005),	is	perhaps	a	sense	of	loss.	Where	art	thou,	homo	ludens?	Has	technology	come	in	the	way	for	play?			The	above-mentioned	article	from	The	Economist	(Sept.	2015)	also	
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included	a	subtle	reference	to	Hirschman’s	study	(without	mentioning	it)	via	an	illustration,	where	again	a	slightly	more	modern	set	of	pincers	grasp	the	heart.	In	this	version,	although	seemingly	operated	by	a	human,	there	is	an	indication	of	lost	control:		 (Illustration:	Brett	Ryder,	The	Economist,	Sept.	12th,	2015)		 Looking	for	the	place	of	the	human	in	organisations	is	by	no	means	new.	A	crucial	event	in	this	history	is	when	Elton	Mayo	convinced	Rockefeller	to	fund	his	research	that	in	turn	promised	to	solve	the	‘problem’	of	democracy	at	the	workplace.	As	O’Connor	(1999:	224)	points	out,	“Mayo	directed	his	attention	to	the	interior,	subjective,	emotional	state	of	the	human	being;	and	he	promoted	a	particular	point	of	view	about	human	nature	based	on	this	view.”	If	Taylor	mechanized	and	economized	time	by	moving	control	to	the	tempo	of	the	machine,	Mayo	would	be	the	one	that	opens	up	to	the	programmable	employee,	the	precondition	for	the	softwarisied	organization.	He	does	this	by	normalizing	the	managerial	interest	in	the	human	as	one	based	on	correcting	the	mind	of	the	employee	so	that	it	better	matches	–	i.e.,	processes	information	to	cybernetically	fit	the	system	–	and	can	start	to	perform	as	human	capital.	To	Mayo,	the	human	in	its	urge	to	take	part,	with	its	questioning	authority	was	all	raw-material	for	the	work	of	the	human	resource	manager:		“His	investigations	stressed	the	irrational,	nonlogical,	and	sentimental	aspect	of	the	human	being;	and,	consistent	with	his	key	sources,	they	also	emphasized	the	basic	deviance	and	maladjustment	of	the	human	being.	The	technique	to	correct	this	maladjustment	also	came	from	psychology:	what	Mayo	called	the	'counseling	interview'	(Roethlisberger	and	Dickson,	1939:	270-91),	now	a	standard	part	of	HRM	practices	(Whitsett	and	Yorks,	1983:	165-85).”	(O’Connor,	1999)		I	am	obviously	not	sharing	Mayo’s	interest	in	trying	to	figure	out	how	to	correct	this	irrational	behaviour	of	humans	in	organisations	(Mayo,	1923).	This	interest	
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in	conducting	the	conduct	of	the	employees	has	driven	management	as	a	form	of	governmentality	in	late	industrialism.	As	already	mentioned,	Mayo’s	agenda	is	important	as	a	step	in	the	preparation	for	the	algorithmic	organisation,	calling	upon	a	certain	management-employee	relationship	that	the	recent	digitalisation	of	information	systems	can	feed	with	decision-making	support	(Mayo,	1945).	Mayo	was	thus	as	central	for	managerial	governmentality	as	was	Taylor.	When	we	try	to	think	with	Agamben,	looking	for	the	bare	life	we	ask	where	the	analogue	(as	opposed	to	digital)	potentials	still	looms	in	organisations.	Admittedly,	there	is	a	de	Certeau	style	of	thinking	here.	Recall	how	his	belief	in	people	often	resulted	in	a	praise	of	everyday	creativity:			
“Every culture proliferates along its margins. Irruptions take place that are called 
‘creations’ in relation to stagnancies. Bubbling out of swamps and bogs, a thousand 
flashes at once scintillate and are extinguished all over the surface of a society. In the 
official imaginary, they are noted only as exceptions or marginal events. … In reality, 
creation is a disseminated proliferation. It swarms and throbs. A polymorphous 
carnival infiltrates everywhere, a celebration both in the streets and in the homes of 
those who are unblended by the aristocratic and museological model of durable 
production.” (de Certeau 1997, pp. 139-40)		 The	analogue	would	represent	pockets	of	transformative	force,	simply	because	of	their	ambiguous,	indecisive	quality,	their	irreducibility	to	either	zero	(0)	or	one	(1).	I	am	indeed	sharing	Mayo’s	Hobbesian-Galileian	view	that	motion	is	the	‘natural	state	of	bodies,’	(a	view	shared	by	Whitehead,	Bergson,	and	Deleuze)	but	have	related	this	as	more	acutely	and	centrally	expressed	in	Spinoza’s	philosophy.	In	Spinoza’s	philosophy	it	is	also	developed	into	a	thinking	with	more	immediate	implications	for	processual	organisation	studies	(Hjorth	and	Holt,	2014).	De	Certeau	is	with	us	also	here	as	we	tie	the	analogous	to	the	indecisive,	vague,	and	as	such	open	to	movement:	“This	nowhere	gives	a	tactic	mobility,	to	be	sure,	but	a	mobility	that	must	accept	the	chance	offerings	of	the	moment,	and	seize	on	the	wing	the	possibilities	that	offer	themselves	at	any	given	moment.	[…]	In	short,	a	tactic	is	an	art	of	the	weak.”	(1984:	37).	We	could	add;	it	is	an	art	of	the	vague.	Deleuze,	the	reader	of	Spinoza	that	manages	to	revitalize	and	renew	the	reception	of	his	ideas,	discusses	power	in	Spinoza	as	intimately	related	to	movement	and	affect:	“[A]	ll	power	is	inseparable	from	a	capacity	for	being	
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trained	eye	were	needed.	This	varied	from	person	to	person,	thus	there	was	room	for	expression	and	style.	Expression	and	style	is	what	we	historically	have	associate	primarily	with	creativity	in	the	arts.	This,	however,	is	presently	emerging	as	a	strong	discourse	on	innovation	(e.g.	Austin	and	Devin,	2003),	i.e.,	that	art	and	science	has	to	mingle	for	there	to	be	innovation.	It	seems	that	expression	and	style,	what	we	associate	with	the	artistic,	is	an	important	condition	for	creativity	to	happen;	creativity	that	is	increasingly	collective	and	springs	from	ensemble	work	(O’Donnel	and	Devin,	2012).	The	algorithmic	organisation	idealises	homogeneity	in	form	so	as	to	limit	variation	of	expression.	The	model	has	to	lend	itself	to	be	replicated,	ease	of	administration	and	fit	with	standards	of	production.	‘Making	do’,	according	to	experience,	tacit	knowledge,	style	and	expression,	is	not	included	as	a	playful	use	of	the	‘grey/vague’.	For	sure,	creativity	has	never	been	limited	to	the	arts	(de	Certeau,	1984),	but	always	been	part	of	human	culture	wherever	this	is	found	(de	Certeau,	1997;	Huizinga,	1938).	Today,	as	a	means	to	handle	the	hangover	of	industrialisation,	the	mature	industrialised	economies	all	stress	the	need	for	innovation	and	entrepreneurship.	Listening	to	this	discourse,	we	sense	a	return	of	expression,	style,	and	imagination,	what	is	called	for	as	an	increase	of	variation	needed	for	a	multiplication	of	differences,	as	a	source	of	newness,	to	happen.	In	line	with	this	Walter	Isaacson,	President	and	CEO	of	Aspen	Institute,	and	author	of	the	Steve	Jobs	biography	(2013),	notes:	“The	most	creative	innovations	of	the	digital	age	came	from	those	who	were	able	to	connect	the	arts	and	sciences.”	(weforum.org,	2014).		Technology	(as	the	ideas	for	a	technique)	are	not	prostheses	of	the	body,	Massumi	(2011:	147)	writes,	“[T]he	senses	are	already	that.	Technologies	are	abstract-event	multipliers	and	disseminators.	They	are	prostheses	of	the	life	of	abstraction.	Aliveness	engines.”	(2011:	147).	By	the	abstract,	Massumi	here	means	what	the	process	philosophers	mean	when	they	talk	about	the	virtual.	The	virtual	is	potentiality	that	could	become	concrete	according	to	the	local	conditions	and	the	immanent	tendency	of	a	process.	A	process	moves	to	the	limit	of	what	it	can	do	given	the	intensity,	‘the	immanent	affirmation’	(Ibid,	p.	84)	of	the	process.	At	this	limit	it	faces	newness.	In	experience	we	find	the	genesis	of	
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things,	Massumi	further	elaborates	(2011:	15),	meaning	the	potentials	for	change	is	still	there,	played	out	in	the	occasion	where	we	find	ourselves.	The	virtual	is	an	abstract	event	potential,	the	potential	becoming	concrete	of,	say,	an	idea.	Technologies	boost	such	tendency	to	become	through	continued	variation.	Technologies	are	not	the	medium,	rather	the	interval,	the	moveability	of	the	change	(Massumi,	2002).	In	this	sense,	technologies	are	not	prostheses	added	onto	the	body,	but	rather	part	of	the	body,	like	the	senses,	and	qualitatively	transforming	its	capacities	and	becomings.	With	technologies,	thus,	it	is	always	a	question	of	‘what	a	body	can	do’	(Spinoza’s	question).	Technologies	are	thus	also	a	medium	for	opening	up	and	increase	our	capacity	–	the	route	to	Spinozian	joy.		“The	body	cannot	determine	the	mind	to	think,	nor	can	the	mind	determine	the	body	to	motion	or	rest,	or	to	anything	else	(if	there	is	anything	else;	Spinoza).”	(The	Ethics,	Part	3,	Prop.	2)		This	is	Spinoza’s	parallelism,	the	mind	and	body	is	one	and	the	same,	there	is	one	mode,	which	is	now	conceived	under	the	attribute	of	thought,	now	under	the	attribute	of	extension.	Technology	would	then	always	be	part	of	the	mind	and	body	and	enlarge	or	extend	both	in	parallel.	Spinoza	can	be	used	to	inquire	into	what	role	technology	has	for	management,	with	a	specific	focus	on	the	tension	(inspired	by	the	so-far	cursory	analysis	of	the	‘Affectus	Comprime’-image	above,	and	the	quote	from	Spinoza	on	lens-making)	between	the	free,	playful	(admittedly	almost	always	romanticised)	hand	guided	by	experience-based	wisdom,	and	the	technologically	directed	template-delimited,	predictable,	efficiency	enhancing	hand	of	management.	Maybe	this	can	lead	us	to	disclose	a	problem	in	today’s	organisations	when	there	is	a	simultaneous	emphasis	on	collective	creativity	and	technology-powered	knowledge-creation	and	communication.	What	does	it	mean	when	organisation	(as	practice	and	process)	is	in	the	technological	grip	of	the	instrumental	hand	(manus)	of	management	(for	which	predictability	and	efficiency	are	the	most	important	considerations)	and	organisation	itself	therefore	grasps	technology	as	a	means	to	increase	predictability	and	efficiency?	Where	does	the	free	hand	go?	Or,	technology	has	precisely	set	the	hand	free	from	the	governing	constraints	of	management?	Technology	has	bent	open	management’s	grasp	and	made	movement	possible?	
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